



















































The coronavirus disease (SARS-CoV-2) 
and the COVID-19 pandemic origi-
nated in China in late 2019 and spread 
throughout the world through inter-
national travel causing immediate and 
immeasurable consequences. Coro-
navirus and the COVID-19 pandemic 
have caused a unique crisis in the en-
tire human history because it literal-
ly affected the whole world, which has 
never happened before. Until this event, 
it was considered that only terrorism, 
confrontations of great powers and/or 
financial crises, such as the one that oc-
curred in 2008, could cause major global 
disturbances which, in turn, could lead 
to widespread tectonic consequences. 
All other causes – including natural or 
man-made disasters or devastating wars 
(like the ones in Syria and Libya and 
before them those in Iraq and Afghan-
istan), had and were seen as having a 
limited regional character and did not 
have a real possibility of affecting the 
whole world. There are also other dis-
ruptive events such as global warming, 
climate change, habitat destruction and 
uncontrolled disposing of large quanti-
ties of waste into the environment that 
will eventually take their toll but so far 
these have been considered "creeping 
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crises" for which the dynamic and busy 
world of today has no time. However, 
the world, governments, and interna-
tional organizations cannot dismiss 
complex crises like COVID-19 (Mikac 
and Spevec 2020: 1-2).
Why is that so? How is it that a disease 
that has extremely low mortality has 
caused changes in life as we have known 
it? What is the cause of such high levels 
of fear in the actions of primarily states 
in dealing with the COVID-19 pandem-
ic? This leads us to the first problem set 
of this research. Part of the answer lies 
in the amount of knowledge about the 
virus itself, in contradictory opinions, 
predictions and actions and in the abil-
ity of the international community to 
respond to such a challenge. Knowledge 
of the coronavirus was extremely lim-
ited at the beginning of the COVID-19 
pandemic, but over time, scientists have 
been able to make significant advances 
in research and currently (mid-Septem-
ber 2020, when this paper was written) 
know much more about the virus itself 
(though still not enough) – the way 
it spreads and its consequences and, 
most importantly, about protection and 
self-protection. It is certainly necessary 
to emphasize fear as a psychological fac-
tor that played a significant role in the 
reaction of all actors – from states to 
the people. The positive aspect in this 
case is that the whole world is "united" 
in the search for a cure for coronavirus 
and for solutions to the crisis in which 
we find ourselves, but the negative is 
that the search for a cure has become a 
hurried pursuit for the Holy Grail with 
global pharmaceutical companies and 
most developed countries as the main 
competitors. That leads us to a contra-
diction that could be explained as si-
multaneous claims and negations of the 
same thing in the opinions, predictions 
and actions of global actors: US official 
policy at the beginning of the global cri-
sis (first quarter of 2020) blamed China 
for the spread of the virus, accusing that 
country of artificially creating it, of not 
warning the world on time about the 
(possible) consequences, and then went 
on to accuse the World Health Organi-
zation (WHO) of favoring China, of not 
predicting events on time, of not acting 
appropriately and of not managing the 
crisis well. On these accusations, Chi-
na and the WHO defended themselves 
by denying such claims. While the "big 
ones" were arguing, paraphrasing the 
old adage When America sneezes, the 
whole world catches a cold, time passed, 
there was no global reaction, but re-
gional organizations and states acted 
by combining different approaches: 
from initial inaction (a state of stand-
still or complete passivity), as was the 
case in the European Union, through 
the balancing in Sweden, which opted 
for moderate security measures, down 
to the complete absence of balance and 
the bandwagoning – which Rendall L. 
Schweller (1994) explains as distancing 
oneself from current threats in order to 
maintain the status quo – which the vast 
majority of countries around the world 
have done by introducing the lockdown. 
From this follows the assumption about 
the ability of the international commu-
nity to respond to the challenge it has 
faced. Ability could be explained as the 
fact or skill of being able to use the ex-
isting possibilities that determines the 
level of success in performing an activi-
ty. Here the role of the international and 
global community will be emphasized, 
because the development of the crisis 
soon took on a global character but the 
global response was absent, and conse-
quently the states were forced to man-
age the effects of the crisis on their own. 
The global international community 
and international organizations (both 
the global ones like the WHO and the 
regional ones like the European Union) 



















































ness to adequately respond to the initial 
challenge of coronavirus, the COVID-19 
pandemic and the emerging crises, which 
has after a long time put the states back 
into the spotlight as the key actors in in-
ternational relations and the main pro-
tagonists in dealing with this crisis and 
consequently caused numerous contra-
dictions, controversies and paradoxes.
Contradictions, controversies and 
paradoxes have characterized the world 
from its genesis to the present day. Every 
social activity is marked by statements 
or phrases that assert or imply both the 
truth and falsity of something (contra-
dictions), discussions marked especial-
ly by the expression of opposing views 
(controversy), and statements that are 
seemingly contradictory or opposed to 
common sense and yet are perhaps true 
(paradoxes). All of the above are inte-
gral parts of crisis management at all 
levels and in all situations, and represent 
initial assumptions in the discussion 
on this topic. This represents the next 
problem set of this research. The great-
er the crisis, the more expressed are the 
features that accompany it. These are 
also "legitimacy" issues within the social 
sciences, politics, and everyday human 
interaction: in all processes where dif-
ferent experiences, views and interests 
exist, attitudes about the causes and 
consequences, what needs to be done 
and how, by what means and by whose 
responsibility will inevitably differ. This 
is further emphasized in areas with no 
clear competencies, detailed procedures 
and well-established mechanisms for 
implementing certain activities: in such 
situations we are often guided by a per-
sonal approach and preferences. All of 
the above is part of the discussion on 
the COVID-19 pandemic and how to 
react to the crisis. This crisis, as already 
mentioned, is unique in human histo-
ry, it is extremely interdisciplinary and 
multi-layered with great current and 
even greater long-term consequences, it 
has affected all segments of society and 
all industries and businesses around the 
world. In the absence of the necessary 
global, interdisciplinary and systemat-
ic response there have inevitably been 
numerous contradictions, controversies 
and paradoxes when it comes to the cri-
sis management process itself.
Everything stated so far serves as an 
introduction to setting the concept of 
this research. The main focus of this re-
search is the impact of the COVID-19 
pandemic on countries as primary ac-
tors in responding to the crisis, primar-
ily on the Republic of Croatia and its 
ability to manage the crisis. The aim of 
the research is to look at the key aspects 
of crisis management and to record a 
number of observations that can serve 
as a basis for creating the first identified 
and then learned lessons for the next 
crises that we as a society and the state 
will face. The central research question 
is explanatory in nature and shall be 
used for discovering the connection be-
tween the normative basis and the prac-
tice in crisis management, for investigat-
ing the causes and reasons behind cer-
tain actions and for explaining the social 
phenomenon of crisis management. The 
research question is: How is Croatia 
managing the crisis in which it finds it-
self? The expected result of the research 
is the contribution to the debate from an 
academic point of view on how and with 
what capabilities the Republic of Croatia 
has managed this complex crisis.
In order to structure the research, the 
text will be divided into five addition-
al sections after the Introduction. The 
second chapter, Theoretical and Meth-
odological Framework, will provide an 
overview of the research methodology. 
The third chapter, entitled The Norma-
tive Approach to Crisis Management in 
the Republic of Croatia, will present the 

























sis management, which provides a basis 
for discussing how Croatia has reacted 
in the current crisis. The next chapter, 
Croatian COVID-19 Pandemic Cri-
sis Management, will give an analysis 
of crisis management compared to the 
normative framework. In the chapter 
entitled Discussion, the aim is to com-
pare normative solutions with current 
practice and to note a number of ob-
servations that might in further analy-
ses provide a basis for identifying and 
learning lessons. The last chapter, also 
the Conclusion, will provide a summary 
of the research and a review of the total 




The crisis we are currently experiencing 
is extremely complex and interdiscipli-
nary, and its observation and analysis 
can be approached from a multitude of 
different perspectives. While crisis ma-
nagement has been studied as part of 
security studies, economics, and ma-
nagement studies, for this purpose the 
classic discipline of crisis management 
will be used as part of security studies 
that has its own special vocabulary and 
concepts. In crisis management analysis, 
a framework consisting of four phases is 
most commonly and globally used: pre-
vention, preparedness, response, and 
recovery. Each phase of the cycle has its 
own principles. Prevention refers to the 
measures, actions and activities taken 
to prevent the occurrence of harmful 
events. Preparedness means the establi-
shment of all forms of cooperation and 
coordination of different actors in de-
aling with potential risks that have the 
capacity to grow into a crisis. Response 
is a reaction to the occurrence that cau-
sed a crisis situation and is carried out 
with the aim of mitigating and repairing 
the consequences. Recovery is an effort 
to return to the original state before the 
crisis broke out.
Furthermore, the key terms and con-
cepts are considered and used in accord-
ance with the following statements. Ac-
cording to Ole Holsti, there are four ref-
erence levels of crisis analysis: the state, 
the bureaucratic organization, society 
and the individual (Kešetović et al. 2013: 
29). As already mentioned, the focus is 
on the state level, since its activities influ-
ence reactions at all other levels. Croatia 
defines a crisis as: "an event or state that 
endangers national security, the health 
and life of citizens, significantly damag-
es the environment or causes significant 
economic damage, and the response to 
such an event or state requires coordi-
nated action by several state bodies and 
coordinated application of measures 
within the competence of those bodies" 
(Croatian Parliament 2017a: Article 3, 
paragraph 2). On the other hand, crisis 
management is: a) the ability of the ob-
served actor to prepare for crisis events 
by developing a rapid and effective re-
sponse when a crisis occurs as well as 
effective crisis management (Kešetović 
and Toth 2012); b) the implementation 
of strategic decisions that include activi-
ties related to action within all phases of 
crisis management (Boin et al. 2010: 18).
The approach developed by Arjen 
Boin, Paul 't Hart, Eric Stern and Bengt 
Sundelius regarding crisis management 
policy in political systems will be used 
as a theoretical framework for the anal-
ysis. The authors consider that "crises 
have an essentially political character" 
(2010: 7), subjective nature and start 
entering the agenda of politicians "when 
policy makers feel threatened by the 
basic structure or fundamental values 
and norms of a system which under the 
pressure of time and highly uncertain 
circumstances requires vital decisions 
to be made" (2010: 12). Threats can have 



















































the crisis in the political spectrum lies 
in the inability of the system to control 
the disturbances. The authors have de-
veloped a theoretical framework that 
involves five critical tasks for crisis man-
agement: observation, decision-making, 
interpretation, completion and learning 
(2010: 20) from which the parts related 
to decision-making and interpretation 
of crisis management will be used in 
this research. Decision-making is a key 
part of the spectrum of crisis response, 
which also includes the institutional 
context in which decisions are made 
and implemented, while interpretation 
is the transformation of a multitude of 
data into a coherent situational picture, 
informing different groups of the public 
and explaining decisions and actions.
Decision-making has, among other 
things, complicated characteristics be-
cause: a) it confronts political leaders 
with great uncertainties about the na-
ture of the problem, the likelihood of fu-
ture development and the possible con-
sequences of different policy options; 
b) decisions must be made relatively 
quickly, under time pressure, which 
means that some of the tried and tested 
methods of the decision-making pro-
cess cannot be applied. This puts politi-
cians in an unenviable position because 
each of them expects a signpost, and in 
a crisis it is very difficult to provide that 
(2010: 46). As a rule, decision-making in 
crises takes place in small groups where 
political and bureaucratic leaders reach 
a kind of joint decision (2010: 48). The 
characteristics of the crisis, especially 
in its early stages, make central coordi-
nation and decision-making on the one 
hand more than desirable, while on the 
other hand almost unattainable. There-
fore, each state, in accordance with the 
normative framework and previous 
practice, decides on a certain level of de-
centralization and improvisation (2010: 
53-61). Finally, it is necessary to men-
tion the role leaders have in responding 
to the crisis. "Leaders are important – 
not as omnipotent decision makers but 
as creators, supporters and guardians of 
an institutional arrangement that leads 
to a process of successful decision-mak-
ing and coordination" (2010: 65).
In terms of the interpretation of the 
crisis, "the crisis creates a context of ba-
sic ambiguities, confusion and specula-
tion, conflicting beliefs, and collective 
awakenings. In these circumstances, it 
is important and extremely difficult for 
politicians to shape the process of social 
and political interpretation by which 
crises are named, understood and as-
sessed – not only by what they are, but 
by what they tell us about social and 
institutional circumstances" (2010: 84). 
In times of crisis it is not uncommon 
for governments to "lose control, at least 
temporarily, over the drama of political 
communication. Events literally over-
whelm them" (2010: 67). Therefore, 
political leaders along with other actors 
try to reduce the public and political un-
certainty and stress caused by the crisis. 
They do that by constantly communi-
cating, presenting data, explaining caus-
es and consequences, and introducing 
their own political and personal cred-
ibility as they interpret the crisis. This 
theoretical framework is outlined in the 
previous three paragraphs, and will be 
applied when analyzing how the crisis 
has been managed in Croatia.
This paper presents a combination of 
results and findings: a) qualitative desk 
top research of primary and secondary 
sources in which methods of analysis 
and synthesis, induction and deduction 
are used; b) interviews with actors di-
rectly involved in crisis response activ-
ities working at the level of middle and 
senior management of public adminis-
tration and the business sector; c) in-
terviews with a focus group composed 

























who were engaged in operational tasks 
during the crisis; d) own knowledge of 
the functioning of state systems primar-
ily through the perspective of the Com-
mander of Civil Protection of Croatia 
and Deputy Chief of the Civil Protection 
Headquarters of the Republic of Croatia 
from 2012 to 2015.
The Normative Approach 
to Crisis Management in 
the Republic of Croatia
The Republic of Croatia and its citizens 
have faced serious crises several times 
since the country became independent. 
The entire Homeland War (1991-1995) 
was one huge crisis, the consequences 
of which are still visible today. In re-
cent times, various crises have somehow 
become frequent and have had a large 
impact on the country and the people. 
"The Kornati tragedy" was a major ac-
cident that took place in 2007 when 12 
firefighters lost their lives during an in-
tervention on the Veliki Kornat island. 
All the interconnected details between 
cause and effect have not yet been deter-
mined, making a detailed investigation 
of the crisis impossible and missing the 
opportunity to learn the maximum of 
lessons. The threat of major floods has 
become constant over the past decade. 
Precisely due to the consequences of 
the great floods in 2014 in the eastern 
part of the country, the Government 
of the Republic of Croatia declared a 
catastrophe for the area of the Vuko-
var-Srijem County (Government of the 
Republic of Croatia 2014). A year later 
Croatia, same as all other countries in 
Southeast Europe, faced a migrant-re-
fugee crisis and participated in the re-
location of more than a million people 
from Greece to Western Europe. By the 
end of the crisis in April 2016, more 
than 660,000 people had passed throu-
gh Croatia (Croatian Institute of Public 
Health, 2017). In both cases, the civil 
protection system was the central plat-
form of coordination that served as the 
backbone of the state’s reaction by lin-
king all other systems and actors in res-
ponse to crises. In addition, there were 
occasional major or minor crises (fires, 
floods, adverse weather conditions due 
to snow and ice, swine flu, cyber attacks, 
etc.). This was the case until the first half 
of 2020 when the country suddenly be-
came simultaneously exposed to several 
different types of crises: it started presi-
ding over the Council of the European 
Union for the first time at the moment 
when the Union was in a deep structu-
ral crisis, with Britain withdrawing from 
full membership and Turkish president 
Recep Tayyip Erdogan threatening and 
pushing refugees and migrants towards 
Europe; several strategic state-owned 
companies (such as INA – a strategic 
oil company) were under strong cy-
ber attacks; the global crisis caused by 
the COVID-19 pandemic began; on 
March 22nd a strong earthquake hit the 
country’s capital, Zagreb, and its surro-
undings (Mikac 2020). Faced with the 
above-mentioned crises, one cannot but 
wonder about the normative-institutio-
nal framework through which the coun-
try or its competent institutions manage 
such diverse crises.
Since the end of the Homeland War, 
the development of the normative 
framework for crisis management has 
gone into several directions. Each sys-
tem (internal security system, securi-
ty-intelligence system, defense system, 
civil protection system, health system 
and others) developed its own proce-
dures and proceedings for managing and 
dealing with crises. In this analysis, the 
focus will be on the concept of building 
an integrated crisis management system 
that includes and coordinates several 
different systems because each complex 
crisis has multiple effects within differ-



















































development of public policies for the 
establishment of such a unified system 
in Croatia were given in the National Se-
curity Strategy of 2002, which indicated 
that a modern system of civil-military 
crisis planning and management would 
be organized by combining different 
parts of the system currently deployed in 
a number of ministries (Croatian Parlia-
ment 2002: paragraph 94). Afterwards, 
a similar approach was applied in the 
strategies that followed (National Strat-
egy for the Prevention and Suppression 
of Terrorism of 2008 and 2015; National 
Strategy and Action Plan to Combat the 
Proliferation of Weapons of Mass De-
struction of 2013; National Strategy for 
Cyber Security and the Action Plan for 
its Implementation of 2015), since there 
was a need to build a unified crisis man-
agement system. However, implementa-
tion did not take place immediately after 
the adoption of these strategies.
The next attempt to establish a unified 
crisis management system was related 
to the adoption of the 2017 National Se-
curity Strategy. The Strategy highlights 
separate crisis management systems, 
but also emphasizes the need to develop 
and establish an integrated system that 
would unite all existing systems into 
a single whole. It is stated that: "Expe-
rience to date in responding to emer-
gencies suggests the need to establish a 
model that will systematically address 
identified shortcomings by ensuring 
coordinated planning, response and 
management in emergencies and crises. 
The goal is to achieve a synergistic pre-
ventive effect of several factors, quickly 
and effectively prevent or eliminate the 
harmful consequences of an emergency 
or crisis event and shorten the recovery 
time and return to functionality before 
the crisis event" (Croatian Parliament 
2017b: Chapter IV, point A). For the 
implementation platform, it was decid-
ed that it would be a homeland security 
system, which had yet to be established.1 
"Organizing the homeland security sys-
tem will ensure the rational, efficient 
and harmonized use of existing resourc-
es in order to reduce or eliminate risks 
to national security. The homeland secu-
rity system will support emergency and 
crisis management, which will include 
participation in crisis management at 
NATO and European Union level. The 
operation of the homeland security sys-
tem will ensure a unique methodology 
and systematic monitoring of risks to 
national security and the determination 
of priorities in action" (Croatian Parlia-
ment 2017b: Chapter IV, point A). In or-
der to harmonize the work of the home-
land security system, it was decided 
that the Coordination of the homeland 
security system would be established. 
"In cases of emergency and crisis, the 
Coordination of the homeland security 
system shall propose to the Government 
of the Republic of Croatia and the Pres-
ident of the Republic of Croatia appro-
priate ways to respond and operation-
ally coordinate state bodies involved in 
the operational response to the crisis" 
(Croatian Parliament 2017b: Chapter 
IV, point A).
1 As a basic difference between the national 
security system and the homeland security 
system, we can point out the spectrum of 
security risks that the systems in question 
deal with. The national security system is in 
charge of analyzing and acting on security 
risks that are primarily directed towards 
the activities of the state and its instituti-
ons, while the homeland security system 
expands the analysis and action towards all 
security risks that pose a danger to citizens, 
the environment, critical infrastructure 
and sustainable development. Thus, by 
introducing the homeland security system, 
Croatia has upgraded and expanded the 
area of dealing with security risks and inc-
luded a larger number of actors and insti-
tutions that are not all part of state insti-


























 The operationalization of pub-
lic policy guidelines related to the es-
tablishment of the homeland security 
system began with the adoption of the 
Homeland Security System Act a few 
months after the adoption of the Strate-
gy. The Act, for the first time in Croatia, 
presented a definition of a crisis (men-
tioned earlier in the text) in an official 
document. The concept of a crisis and its 
definition were studies by a number of 
Croatian academic authors even before 
this official definition from 2017, but 
those definitions did not oblige State au-
thorities to act upon them. According to 
its basic provisions, the Act "establishes 
a system of homeland security for the 
purpose of systematic management of 
security risks relevant to national secu-
rity and crisis management" (Croatian 
Parliament 2017a: Article 1, paragraph 
1) and "regulates the coordinated ac-
tion of the body of the homeland se-
curity system and the implementation 
of activities and tasks within the com-
petence of the body of the homeland 
security system arising from this Act, 
relating to security risk management 
and crisis management" (Croatian Par-
liament 2017a: Article 1, paragraph 2). 
Furthermore, the Act foresees the Na-
tional Security Council as the central 
body of the homeland security system 
and prescribes the obligations of the 
Coordination for the homeland security 
system. It also describes how crises shall 
be coordinated: "In case of a gradual or 
sudden crisis, which poses a risk to na-
tional security, the Coordination for the 
homeland security system shall propose 
to the Government of the Republic of 
Croatia to declare a crisis, form crisis 
management headquarters and ways to 
respond to the crisis" (Croatian Parlia-
ment 2017a: Article 10, paragraph 2).
Since then, the Coordination for the 
homeland security system has become 
operational, initial annual work plans 
have been adopted and approved by the 
National Security Council, and one of 
the goals for 2019 was to develop stand-
ard operating procedures and manuals 
for emergency and crisis management 
(the Office of the National Security 
Council 2018). Part of the professional 
and academic public, who follow and 
are particularly interested in the sub-
ject matter, felt satisfaction at the fact 
that the process of establishing a crisis 
management system has finally been 
launched with the aim of linking and 
coordinating the fragmented capabili-
ties of different actors before and during 
crises. Further in the analysis, there will 
be an overview of how Croatia reacted 
in this crisis.
Croatian COVID-19 Pandemic 
Crisis Management
The test of the effectiveness of previo-
us efforts in building a functional crisis 
management system came in early 2020, 
when Croatia faced several different and 
very demanding crises at the same time 
(mentioned earlier). Throughout the 
crises, a significant number of different 
institutions and individuals have been 
engaged and great political, organizatio-
nal and physical efforts have been made 
to manage them and mitigate their con-
sequences in best way possible. It should 
be noted that at no time was there a risk 
of collapse of any system, of the institu-
tions or of the political decision-making 
process, which would have lead to an 
even greater crisis. However, emphasis 
should at this point in time be placed on 
"what could have been done better", be-
cause there have been situations that co-
uld have been dealt with faster and more 
efficiently, such as clearing the earthqu-
ake debris in Zagreb and the six months 
that it took to pass a law on repairing the 
damage caused by the earthquake. Ano-
ther issue identified during this period 



















































affects the coordination of actions. For 
example, when strategic state-owned 
companies were under cyber attacks, 
some of them failed to report this (out 
of a desire to protect their brand, repu-
tation and company market value), thus 
making it impossible for the competent 
law enforcement institutions to investi-
gate all cases in detail and coordinate 
the response to attacks. These examples, 
as well as some other issues observed 
during the parallel crises of early 2020, 
serve to show that the field of crisis ma-
nagement as a discipline and an appro-
ach to crises is itself marked by crises in 
theoretical, normative and operational 
knowledge and activities – who, what, 
when, how and why should do somet-
hing.
Focusing on the central theme of 
this research, the COVID-19 pandem-
ic and crisis management, in relation to 
prevention (the first phase of the crisis 
management cycle) Croatia has recog-
nized the risks of epidemics and pan-
demics. These have been identified and 
analyzed in the 2015 and 2019 Disaster 
Risk Assessment for the Republic of 
Croatia. Both documents state that pan-
demics are the kind of danger that can 
spiral out of control and turn into an 
event of catastrophic proportions. In the 
documents, the flu virus and the ensu-
ing pandemic were considered and the 
description of the scenario envisages the 
exact same course of events that we have 
witnessed – the virus developed in Asia, 
from where it spread to Europe through 
international travel, and thus to Croatia 
(Government of the Republic of Croa-
tia 2015; Government of the Republic 
of Croatia 2019). It predicts that in the 
most likely adverse event "the epidem-
ic could last at least 9 weeks. Influenza 
and its complications kill 860 people in 
9 weeks (mortality of 0.01%)." On the 
other hand, the prediction for the worst-
case scenario was that "in 9 weeks, a to-
tal of 2,580 of all infected persons would 
die (mortality of 0.2%)" (Government 
of the Republic of Croatia 2019: 41). 
Now, six months into the COVID-19 
pandemic, it can be seen that we are far 
from these figures – the number of in-
fected is around 17,000 and the number 
of deaths is below 300. Also, concerning 
prevention, it is necessary to point out 
another detail from the National Securi-
ty Strategy from 2017, which states that 
"an integrated health system, accessible 
to all citizens of the Republic of Croa-
tia, will continue to develop prevention 
measures and capacity building in pub-
lic health aimed at preventing infec-
tious diseases and mass non-infectious 
diseases" (Croatian Parliament 2017b: 
Chapter IV, point B). In terms of this 
part it can be pointed out that Croatia 
recognizes the risks of epidemics and 
pandemics and has established insti-
tutions and procedures to provide the 
necessary response, whereby the ability 
and effectiveness of the reaction signifi-
cantly depend on the speed and manner 
of virus spread, virus type, time of year 
and additional factors.
Regarding the transition from preven-
tion to preparedness phase (the second 
phase of the crisis management cycle), 
Croatia and its institutions actively 
monitored developments related to the 
coronavirus situation in China and the 
spread of the COVID-19 pandemic. The 
Croatian Institute of Public Health (the 
leading institution of the health system 
responsible for the development of pub-
lic policies and guidelines for public 
health and in this case, the rules of con-
duct in the period before, during and af-
ter epidemics and pandemics) has been 
active developing and publishing quality 
materials, guidelines and instructions 
on the basis of which all competent 
bodies and citizens acted. Thus, in the 
prevention phase and the initial part 

























work was done to minimize the con-
sequences of a potential crisis, because 
with the development of the situation in 
our environment it was obvious that the 
question is not whether the crisis will 
happen, but when and how ready we 
will be. The preparedness phase began 
with the activation of the Crisis Head-
quarters of the Ministry of Health at the 
end of January and the Civil Protection 
Headquarters of the Republic of Croa-
tia in mid-February. The timely activa-
tion of these two headquarters enabled 
the necessary preparations for the crisis 
ahead. Every crisis carries uncertainties, 
time pressures and concern about how 
ready we are to react. In this phase, of 
the many open questions, two in par-
ticular should be singled out. First, 
how much protective equipment did 
the country have? Second, what about 
the activation of the homeland securi-
ty system that is the law defines as the 
national crisis management platform? 
In terms of protective equipment, it was 
obvious that no country had sufficient 
amounts of protective equipment, which 
is understandable because of the cost, 
storage and maintenance issues related 
to equipment that might never be used. 
Croatia initially had some protective 
equipment in stock, but then went on to 
work on intensive procurement (receiv-
ing donations, purchasing, starting its 
own production). This was an appropri-
ate reaction and answer to the issue. The 
answer to the second question related to 
the activation of the homeland security 
system in the preparedness phase was 
missing and it was not possible to un-
derstand why the Government did not 
activate this system. We had to wait for 
the reaction phase for indications of an 
answer.
For Croatia, the reaction phase began 
on February 25th, when the first infected 
person was registered in Croatia. After 
that, numerous activities to deal with the 
crisis and its consequences took place on 
a daily basis. Regarding the international 
perspective of the initial response to the 
crisis, numerous aspects and situations 
described in various studies have been 
confirmed: International organizations 
either lack the power – such as World 
Health Organization, which works ac-
cording to the principle of recommen-
dations – or are again caught by surprise 
with the situation and react quite late, 
like the European Union (Mikac 2020: 
5). Here it is necessary to single out two 
opinions that speak of the difficult situ-
ation at the beginning of the reaction to 
the crisis. First, the European Union has 
been late in responding to the crisis and 
is therefore forced to engage in ad hoc 
reactive measures and activities. Politi-
cal leaders "underestimated" the magni-
tude of the danger posed by the corona-
virus, as the president of the European 
Commission Ursula von der Leyen ad-
mitted: "I think that all of us who are 
not experts initially underestimated the 
coronavirus" (Bild 2020). Second, re-
garding the direct consequences of the 
crisis on human losses, Slovenian infec-
tious disease specialist Andrej Trampuž 
believes that "the World Health Organi-
zation and the European Union (when it 
comes to Europe) are most responsible 
for the coronavirus pandemic in which 
a huge number of people died." Neither 
of them reacted in time, or rather their 
reaction was very belated. He states that 
the virus arrived from China to Italy 
and then spread from Italy through-
out Europe, while "the Italians are not 
to blame for what happened to them. 
They are the victims of misjudgments 
by the WHO and the EU. They should 
have sent all possible medical and sci-
entific assistance to Italy. They should 
have sent virologists, infectious disease 
specialists, epidemiologists and all the 
necessary equipment, in order to create 
a true quarantine in Italy and prevent 



















































WHO and the EU did not do that and 
they failed the exam. They did not do 
so because of economic lobbies, which 
pressured for the European borders not 
to close to avoid possible profit losses" 
(Marković 2020). The state of delay, in-
comprehension, lack of solidarity, clos-
ing of borders led each country to turn 
to itself and work on its own vision and 
crisis management skills. This is the 
context in which Croatia entered the 
response phase to the COVID-19 pan-
demic.
The executive authority decided that 
the response to the crisis would be based 
on the "Whole-of-Government" ap-
proach, with the civil protection system 
as the central framework of Croatia's 
response to the crisis. The system itself 
has been activated to the full of its capa-
bilities and available capacities. At state 
level, the Civil Protection Headquarters 
of the Republic of Croatia have become 
the place for making strategic respons-
es and from where all key activities are 
directed. The Civil Protection Directo-
rate of the Ministry of the Interior de-
termined all administrative, logistical, 
communication and coordination tasks 
for the needs of the Headquarters and 
the system as a whole, as well as cooper-
ation with all institutions from the pub-
lic and private sector. All regional and 
local civil protection commands have 
been activated, each carrying out activi-
ties and instructions from the state level 
in their area of responsibility. Alongside 
with the civil protection system, the en-
tire health system – from the Ministry 
of Health, the Crisis Headquarters of the 
Ministry of Health, the Croatian Insti-
tute of Public Health, all health facilities 
and staff – were active and selflessly en-
gaged to the maximum "from day zero" 
(Kranjčević 2020: 12). With them, many 
other systems and subsystems were en-
gaged to a significant extent and con-
tributed to the overall effort. All of them 
are still very actively involved because 
the crisis is ongoing.
The initial course of action was 
marked largely by a general lockdown, 
the slowing down and cessation of nu-
merous economic and social activi-
ties, the introduction of restrictions on 
movement and recommendations on 
physical distancing. According to re-
search conducted by Oxford University 
COVID-19 government response track-
er, at one time during March 2020 Cro-
atia was the country that took the most 
restrictive measures (Večernji.hr 2020a). 
The Government established a Scientific 
Council (which includes a number of 
top Croatian medical/health scientists) 
with the aim of exchanging opinions on 
measures to be taken in combating the 
epidemic, assessing the situation and 
making recommendations for further 
action (tportal.hr 2020a). The Coun-
cil and its members were very active 
in the months that followed. A public 
survey conducted at the end of March 
by Dnevnik Nova TV showed that 94% 
of the respondents supported the Gov-
ernment in the implementation of pub-
lic health measures, and 63% thought 
that our measures were better than in 
the rest of the EU (Telegram 2020). The 
Civil Protection Headquarters of the 
Republic of Croatia met daily, tirelessly 
communicated with all groups of the in-
terested public and directed the national 
crisis response. Therefore, it can be said 
that at the beginning of the crisis, while 
faced with a number of difficulties, Cro-
atia reacted quite well in the health and 
security segment, while in some other 
areas such as financial management, 
economy and tourism, we cannot be 
satisfied with the initial reaction of the 
competent institutions. Moreover, this 
crisis has shown that the above sectors 
do not have crisis plans and that their 
leaders are not adequately trained in cri-

























having difficulties or hardly adjusting 
to functional operation in a state of cri-
sis. Also, most business owners expect 
ready-made solutions and assistance 
from the state, and only a small number 
of them have the readiness and ability to 
cope with the crisis (Mikac 2020: 6). In 
this regard, there have been some initi-
atives for the establishment of a Crisis 
Headquarters for the economy (Crisis 
Economic Council of the Government 
of the Republic of Croatia) which would 
include representatives of the public, the 
real and the scientific sectors to advise 
the Government on the best possible 
crisis solutions. However, according 
to publicly available sources of infor-
mation, it is not possible to determine 
whether such headquarters/council has 
been established and, if so, whether it is 
operational. In other words, the begin-
ning of the crisis was marked by confu-
sion in the sectors of finance, economy 
and tourism, which could be reduced 
to a common denominator as "Govern-
ment measures for the economy show 
that they are completely lost in the cri-
sis" (Vuković 2020a). No one remem-
bered to propose, and the Government 
did not seem to deem necessary, the 
establishment of a Crisis Management 
Council, which would advise the Gov-
ernment on the necessary interdiscipli-
nary crisis measures and which of all of 
the advisory bodies would be the most 
necessary one. To conclude this section, 
the first part of the crisis was character-
ized by a very good reaction in health 
and security, great disorientation in fi-
nance, economy and tourism and a very 
clumsy statement by Prime Minister 
Andrej Plenković that Croatia is at war 
with coronavirus, at war with panic and 
at war with economic consequences of 
the pandemic (Nacional 2020a). With 
that statement, he unnecessarily mili-
tarized the vocabulary of the crisis and 
instead of calming the situation only 
contributed even more to the panic.
Following the consolidation of the 
condition in all sectors, the continua-
tion of crisis management was marked 
by a significant easing of lockdown 
measures, a gradual reopening of the 
borders and greater freedom of move-
ment. Recommendations regarding pro-
tection measures, self-protection and 
physical distancing remained in force. 
During that time – between April and 
June – the Government faced two major 
challenges. The first was to coordinate 
the implementation of epidemiological 
measures and organize parliamentary 
election (held on 5 July). The other, to 
determine whether to "open the country 
up" in anticipation of the tourist season 
and to what extent. Regarding the first 
challenge, with the active preparation 
of all realistically feasible scenarios and 
possibilities, this period is marked by 
the beginning of stronger political influ-
ence on analyses, assessments and rec-
ommendations of the Civil Protection 
Headquarters, which ultimately resulted 
in a statement by the Health Minister, 
Vili Beroš, (mid-September) that the 
Headquarters are a political body, but 
that none of their decisions were polit-
ically motivated (Jutarnji.hr 2020). Very 
inconvenient and very untoward. When 
it is said that the Headquarters are a po-
litical body (and the essence of politics 
is the struggle for power, influence and 
positions), the essence of the message 
sent is understood quite differently by 
different people. Certain decisions that 
the Headquarters began to make from 
April to June had, to a lesser or a greater 
extent, a political background and con-
notation (permission to hold a church 
procession on the island of Hvar on 
April 10th when the whole country was 
in lockdown, the Sunday work ban, al-
lowing masses to be held while all other 
gatherings were banned, the re-opening 
of the borders with Bosnia and Herze-
govina due to elections, etc.) and that is 



















































polls on the popularity of public figures 
on the case of Beroš. From April to Sep-
tember "Beroš’s drop in ratings became 
a phenomenon; that man slipped from 
30 to 3 percent in 6 months" (Frlan 
Gašparović 2020). In addition to the 
above, the Headquarters and the civil 
protection system continued to do their 
best and were able to manage the crisis 
with the support of all other institutions 
involved. During this time, the finance, 
economy and tourism sectors began 
to keep pace with developments, the 
Government made significant progress 
compared to the initial situation, so that 
in these sectors most activities looked 
much better than at the beginning of the 
reaction (but was that good enough?). 
As the whole situation gradually con-
solidated and Croatia started recording 
days without no infected persons, Plen-
ković once again needed to make a bom-
bastic statement, this time at the end of 
May, saying that Croatia had defeated 
COVID-19, that the Government had 
defeated COVID-19, that we had over-
come the epidemic and that at the eco-
nomic and social level the epidemic was 
also defeated (Nacional 2020b). Purely 
political and too premature.
Regarding the second challenge, 
whether to reopen the country for the 
upcoming tourist season and to what 
extent, the Government opted for a "cal-
culated risk" and that is why the tour-
ist season was better than expected, as 
Plenković stated. "We have achieved 
this by opening up on time, by apply-
ing the calculated risk approach, and 
everything that was not completely shut 
down posed a risk. However, this was 
not accidental but based on consulta-
tions with prominent scientists who said 
this spring, not just based on observing 
past pandemics but based on attempts 
to predict what will happen during the 
summer months, that the character of 
the virus did not change; it is just that 
the people's resilience to the virus is 
higher during the summer months. This 
allowed us to have a much better tour-
ist season than expected, and in that 
regard, we rank at the very top when 
compared with our competitors from 
the European Union and the Mediterra-
nean. So that was a good, wise, justified 
move and we would repeat it if we found 
ourselves in another situation of that 
kind" (Večernji.hr 2020b).
In the summer began the third part 
of the reaction to the crisis, described 
by scientist Ivan Đikić in the following 
way: "the Headquarters were set up as a 
political body, but in the beginning, out 
of fear, the Headquarters implement-
ed perhaps 100 percent professional 
measures in their work. And then the 
Headquarters started being perceived 
as an expert body and all the scientists 
of the world supported such an attitude 
of the Headquarters. But the moment 
political pressure to open the borders 
with Bosnia and Herzegovina started, 
partly because of the election, and the 
pressure to engage in aggressive tourism 
promotion as if that was our only sal-
vation, or when it was said that the vi-
rus had weakened, and that came from 
Minister Beroš, it became immediately 
obvious that by doing so the Headquar-
ters were making increasingly politically 
motivated decisions, less and less mo-
tivated by expert data. And this caused 
the majority of citizens to lose trust in 
them. That is why today the citizens no 
longer believe that they are a body of 
experts" (tportal.hr 2020b). During the 
tourist season, the impression was that 
the financial, economic and tourism 
sectors had started to do their job more 
efficiently and together with diplomacy 
(of course, with the constant support of 
the health profession) worked very well 
in different markets and communicated 
daily with many domestic and interna-

























protection system was still working on 
already well-established tasks, but the 
end of the summer showed that it was 
slowing down and losing pace with the 
development of events, and that events 
were happening faster than it could re-
spond to them. Since what has just been 
described is also the current situation (at 
the moment when this paper was being 
written), the following analysis will de-
termine what the reason behind that is.
In conclusion to this part, one needs 
to ask what happened to the homeland 
security system and its role in crisis 
management? Official information is 
very scanty. On March 5th, 2020, a ses-
sion of the National Security Council 
(the central body of the homeland se-
curity system in accordance with the 
Homeland Security System Act) was 
held. The session was jointly convened 
by the President of the Republic of Croa-
tia Zoran Milanović and the Prime Min-
ister Andrej Plenković. "Members of the 
Government and the Civil Protection 
Headquarters of the Republic of Croatia 
reported on all activities undertaken in 
the past two months related to the sup-
pression of the coronavirus (Covid 19) 
epidemic at both national and EU level, 
given the fact that Croatia is currently 
presiding over the Council of the Eu-
ropean Union. It was concluded that all 
measures taken so far have been timely, 
effective and transparent. In addition to 
all activities related to health and secu-
rity, possible consequences for finance, 
tourism and the economy were ana-
lyzed. Following the discussion, it was 
concluded that all competent institu-
tions should continue to take additional 
measures in accordance with the needs, 
including regular meetings of the Euro-
pean Union Health Council" (Office of 
the National Security Council 2020). The 
Coordination for the homeland security 
system held a session on April 8th (the 
reaction to the crisis began on February 
25th, and the coronavirus epidemic was 
declared March 12th) at which Plenković 
expressed that "the system [of homeland 
security] works well through the nation-
al Civil Protection Headquarters, which 
was established in a timely manner and 
which takes appropriate measures in 
the fight against coronavirus, as well as 
through the lightning reactions of all 
services after the earthquake in Zagreb 
a few weeks ago, which did everything 
to ensure the security of citizens, clean 
the city and all other things that fol-
lowed – from preparations for repairing 
the damage, through drafting the laws, 
to finding the sources of financing for 
the reconstruction of the city" (Govern-
ment of the Republic of Croatia 2020). 
After this, information on the activities 
of the National Security Council and 
of the Coordination for the homeland 
security system was no longer publicly 
available, so this part of analysis will be 
concluded.
Discussion
For the purposes of the discussion, it is 
necessary to specify the variables that 
determine its framework and content. 
Three of them will be used. First, it is 
much easier to be a critic of other peo-
ple's thoughts, words and deeds than a 
creator of your own. Therefore, the aut-
hors have tried to express not a critique 
but their observations about certain 
activities, with the aim of indicating that 
there is a possibility, room and need for 
change. Second, the authors wished to 
avoid the trap of what Nassim Nicholas 
Taleb calls naive empiricism, that is, a 
"disgusting method of gathering selecti-
ve corroborating evidence" that supports 
only one thesis (2009: 29). Third, as this 
crisis has caused numerous contradicti-
ons, controversies and paradoxes, certa-
in opinions (of scientists, experts, chro-
niclers, politicians, entrepreneurs) were 



















































the model and manner of managing this 
crisis.
The discussion should be opened with 
two statements. First, that the Govern-
ment did not use all available capabili-
ties. It did not activate the homeland 
security system and/or the Coordina-
tion for the homeland security system as 
the central platform and actor of crisis 
management, although that would have 
been expected in accordance with the 
Homeland Security System Act. Like-
wise, the initial impulse for the activa-
tion of the system and the operation 
of the Coordination for the homeland 
security system did not come from the 
homeland security system itself. Earli-
er, it was stated that one session of the 
National Security Council was held 
(March 5th) as well as one session of the 
Coordination for the homeland security 
system (April 8th) with very brief state-
ments on what was discussed and what 
the next activities would be. There may 
have been additional activities, but they 
are not available or visible to the average 
observer nor to the analyst, so it can be 
concluded that they did not take place. 
Second, it is important to point out that 
no crisis has ever been officially declared 
– although there is a clear definition of 
crisis in the Homeland Security System 
Act and there is a mechanism for pro-
posing it to the Government. There-
fore, it remains quite unclear to almost 
everyone why the crisis has not been de-
clared. Was it not even suggested? Has 
the proposal to declare a crisis not been 
adopted by the Government? How does 
the process of proposing and declaring 
a crisis function in general? An addi-
tional challenge to the fact that the crisis 
has not been declared is that everyone 
has talked about it, we have obviously 
found ourselves in a crisis of all possi-
ble forms and values, and on the other 
hand, the Government has pointed out 
that we are at war. How can one be at 
war without being in crisis? These two 
examples alone shed light on the incon-
sistency between the existing normative 
framework of crisis management and its 
implementation in practice. It is impor-
tant to reiterate (stated at the beginning 
of this section) that activating the home-
land security system and the Coordina-
tion for the homeland security system as 
a platform and actor for crisis manage-
ment is an opportunity and a capability 
that the Government did not use, but 
also one that it did not necessarily need. 
It would have been logical to use it but 
certainly the Government can decide on 
other options, which it did by activating 
the civil protection system and the Civil 
Protection Headquarters of the Repub-
lic of Croatia as the central elements for 
managing this crisis. Such a decision by 
the Government is its legitimate right, 
but it remained unexplained and con-
fused all those who expected the home-
land security system and the Coordina-
tion for the homeland security system to 
play a central role in crisis management. 
This is one of the reasons behind some 
of the contradictions, controversies and 
paradoxes that followed in the crisis 
management process.
In this part, some key messages from 
people who have political, business, so-
cial, scientific and journalistic credibil-
ity and/or influence will be singled out 
to point to the challenges of managing 
this crisis. These statements should be 
observed bearing in mind the time of 
their making. The first set of statements 
was made in April at the beginning of 
the crisis and refers to crisis manage-
ment framework, content and manner. 
Observing the activities of the home-
land security system, activist Gordan 
Bosanac believes that "the homeland 
security system has not disappeared. 
It simply never existed, and the COV-
ID-19 pandemic (with the earthquake 

























the term 'homeland security'" (Bosanac 
2020). Quite the opposite is the opinion 
of journalist Petra Kostanjšak from the 
magazine Hrvatski vojnik, who believes 
that the Croatian model of coordinated 
response to crises in the first phase suc-
cessfully passed the extraordinary exam 
(Hrvatski vojnik 2020), while journalist 
Ivica Đikić from Novosti states that "due 
to the spread of the corona infection and 
the Zagreb earthquake, all the precondi-
tions were created for Damir Krstičević 
and the famous "homeland security sys-
tem" to enter the scene. However, Plen-
ković believed that Davor Božinović was 
his only associate who could manage the 
crisis relatively calmly and professional-
ly" (Đikić 2020). On the topic, security 
analyst Igor Tabak wrote in May that "in 
recent months it has not been difficult 
to see how Croatia has practically been 
experiencing a clash of two crisis man-
agement and response systems – the civ-
il protection system and the homeland 
security system" (Tabak 2020). Back in 
April, scientist Vuk Vuković said that 
the crisis has revealed that Croatia has 
major problems in functioning during 
the crisis (Vuković 2020b), entrepreneur 
Nenad Bakić believed that Croatia had 
successfully managed the crisis thus far 
(Bakić 2020), and security expert Robert 
Barić that Croatia does not have a crisis 
management system but has been man-
aging the current crisis with a series of 
improvisations (Barić 2020). Infectious 
disease specialist Vladimir Krajinović 
states that luck is the primary reason for 
Croatia's success in the fight against the 
coronavirus epidemic. "There are several 
reasons. Although many think that it is 
all due to the National Headquarters, I 
will say that it was primarily – luck. (...) 
Croatia was lucky that the virus first 
came to Italy, so we had time to "wake 
up" and prepare. The cases came one by 
one and we somehow managed to get 
organized. (...) The second reason are 
the isolation measures, and the Nation-
al Headquarters did a pretty good job 
there. Personally, I think they should 
and could have been even faster with 
the closure measures. Many things were 
done reactively, and not proactively. (...) 
The third reason that helped us was pos-
sibly the fact that the virus did not enter 
the health system or nursing homes for 
a long time, as was the case, for example, 
with neighboring Slovenia. However, we 
now see that the virus entered nursing 
homes at a later stage and that does not 
favor of the Headquarters" (Krajnović 
2020). Therefore, during April we wit-
nessed very different statements that 
showed us that there are significantly dif-
ferent understandings and experiences 
of the framework, content and ways of 
managing the crisis.
The second set of opinions emerged 
during and after the summer. Tourism 
expert Veljko Ostojić stated that Cro-
atia was sending confusing messages, 
and the competition was waiting for 
our mistake to take our guests (Ko-
retić 2020). Scientist Ivan Đikić be-
lieved that "Croatia played a very good 
match from February to June. Every 
decision was made in such way that it 
was known what would happen in the 
next two weeks. Sometime in mid-June, 
when we declared that the coronavirus 
in Croatia was defeated, there was a re-
laxation, a misunderstanding of certain 
decisions, and poor communication 
and this, in turn, led to a loosening of 
public tension. People somehow began 
to understand that the virus was not so 
dangerous anymore, and now for the 
past month we have been faced with a 
relaxation, misunderstandings, and bad 
decisions" (tportal 2020c). Entrepreneur 
Branko Roglić thinks "that the Govern-
ment has reacted extraordinarily so far, 
that it has taken everything necessary 
to maintain employment and keep the 
economy alive. The economy would 



















































without these measures that we are all 
expecting to benefit from. There would 
be layoffs and companies would go 
bankrupt" (Novi List 2020). At the same 
time, the Association of Entrepreneurs 
"Glas" and its executive director Dražen 
Oreščanin considered numerous deci-
sions of the Government to be belated, 
discriminatory or an alibi for the poor 
functioning of the Headquarters (No-
vac.hr 2020; Glaspoduzetnika.hr 2020; 
N1 2020a). Concerning the work of the 
Civil Protection Headquarters, scientist 
and member of the Scientific Council of 
the Government Gordan Lauc claimed: 
"When we see how some other things 
work in this country, the Headquar-
ters function fantastically. There were 
certainly mistakes and misunderstand-
ings, some things could have been done 
better, but in the context of our state, I 
think that the Headquarters have done a 
solid job and that there is not that much 
that we can hold against them" (net.hr 
2020). Another scientist and member 
of the Scientific Council of the Gov-
ernment, Dragan Primorac, also thinks 
that the Headquarters have been doing a 
good job, that the position of the mem-
bers of the Headquarters is among the 
most ungrateful in Croatia and says that 
after months spent under stress there 
was a certain relaxation by everyone, 
which he considers natural and normal 
(Jutarnji.hr 2020b). President Zoran 
Milanović, on the other hand, believes 
that the Headquarters are a para-con-
stitutional body, referring in particular 
to the decisions restricting movement, 
which the Headquarters proposed and 
introduced and which in his opinion are 
not within the competence of the Head-
quarters but of the Parliament (Libero-
portal.hr 2020). At its session held on 
September 14th, 2020, the Constitutional 
Court of the Republic of Croatia ruled 
on the constitutionality of the decisions 
of the National Civil Protection Head-
quarters stating that the Headquarters 
did not violate anyone's constitutional 
rights by issuing a series of decisions, in-
cluding movement restriction measures. 
Three judges, Andrej Abramović, Goran 
Selanec and Lovorka Kušan disagreed 
with the majority decision of their Con-
stitutional Court colleagues and issued 
separate opinions on this topic (Raić 
Knežević 2020). This all serves to show 
that this is a sensitive issue on which no 
consensus of opinion has been reached 
even within the Constitutional Court. 
Milanović commented on the decisions 
as follows: "Certain human rights have 
been suspended and for quite some 
time. A very vague and loose legal 
framework has been adopted and the 
Constitutional Court is scared, but this 
is only human" (N1 2020b). Finally, it is 
not pretentious to conclude that each of 
the above mentioned sources in the pre-
vious and this chapter is right, though 
not entirely because everyone has ex-
perienced, analyzed and commented 
on the management of the crisis from 
their perspective, taking into account 
own previous experience and referring 
to their part of expertise. This points to 
a vast area that has opened up concern-
ing the manner in which this crisis was 
managed, that needs to be researched, 
analyzed and documented in order to 
extract all possible observations, identi-
fy and learn lessons.
Everything mentioned thus far fits per-
fectly into the previously set theoretical 
framework for crisis analysis. In the part 
related to decision-making, everything 
that Croatian decision makers under-
went corresponds to the theoretical pat-
tern developed by Arjen Boin and co-
authors. Decision-making, especially of 
a strategic nature, confronted Croatian 
political leaders with great uncertain-
ties about the nature of the problem, the 
likelihood of future developments and 
the possible consequences of different 

























to be made relatively quickly, under time 
pressure and without the possibility of 
theoretical verification of effects. All 
this has put them in a very unenviable 
position because and everyone expects 
leadership and solutions, and in a crisis 
it is very difficult to provide that. Deci-
sion-making was done in small groups 
with only few participating members of 
the Civil Protection Headquarters (oth-
er members of the Headquarters were 
not involved). As far as decentralization 
and improvisation are concerned, these 
have been applied to a significant extent. 
Management was decentralized and 
strategic decisions were delegated to re-
gional and local commands of the civil 
protection system. While improvisation 
was pervasive (which is not necessarily 
bad management on its own) it is the 
Croatian reality in management, not 
only in crises but also in regular busi-
ness. Finally, let us not forget the role of 
the leader. The only true political leader 
in this crisis was Prime Minister Andrej 
Plenković. Regardless of his awkward 
and/or premature statements, he did not 
interfere in the work of key bodies, did 
not convene press conferences to praise 
the results, or publicly influence the pro-
cesses. Instead, every time when there 
was a vacuum, when at lower levels pol-
iticians got stranded and/or were stuck 
with challenges – he stepped forward 
and stabilized the political situation 
with his credibility.
This crisis can be interpreted as bring-
ing about many ambiguities, confusion 
and speculation, conflicting beliefs, and 
collective awakenings. Therefore, it has 
been and still is extremely difficult for 
politicians to shape the process of social 
and political interpretation of the cri-
sis. For this reason, their openness and 
availability to communicate primarily 
with the media on a daily basis should 
be saluted, but they should be criticized 
for not hiring crisis communication ex-
perts and spokespersons (who would 
do it better than them, while they could 
focus on analysis and policy). Finally, it 
is important to point out that the gov-
ernment did not lose control over the 
temporary drama of political commu-
nication and, more importantly, over 
events – despite all the difficulties and 
improvisations.
The last part of this section is devot-
ed to the insights gained through inter-
views with actors directly involved in 
crisis response activities, who worked at 
the level of middle and senior manage-
ment of public administration and the 
business sector; interviews with a focus 
group composed of members of the civ-
il protection unit who were engaged in 
operational tasks during the crisis; and 
own knowledge of the functioning of 
state systems gained primarily from the 
perspective of the Commander of Civil 
Protection of Croatia and Deputy Chief 
of the Civil Protection Headquarters of 
the Republic of Croatia from 2012 to 
2015. This paragraph is also the short-
est because the insight gained is mostly 
confirmed by what has previously been 
mentioned. Thus, the opinions of the re-
spondents and the author's personal ex-
perience confirm the perception of how 
Croatia manages crises in general, and 
the current crisis: primarily by applying 
the "whole of Government" approach 
instead of an integrated crisis manage-
ment system, where we rather rely on 
improvisation than set up the systems 
and play by the rules, where everyone 
does everything and therefore everyone 
exhausts their capacity, and where there 
is no inter-agency and interdisciplinary 
analysis after each action which means 
we enter the crisis every time from al-
most the same starting position.
Conclusion
The research conducted showed nu-



















































versies and paradoxes arising from the 
non-existence of a crisis management 
system that would clearly define the 
competencies, powers and responsibili-
ties of all actors – from the Government 
to the citizens. Therefore, it can be conc-
luded that the research concept as well 
as the theoretical and methodological 
framework have been well set in order to 
conduct this research. The topic is mul-
tifaceted, everyone observes and analy-
zes it from their own angle of expertise. 
For the purposes of this research, the 
authors decided to compare the conne-
ction between the normative basis and 
the practice in crisis management, to 
investigate the causes and reasons for 
certain actions, and to explain crisis ma-
nagement as a social phenomenon. This 
was done by means of an overview of the 
normative solutions and practices, the 
causes and reasons for certain actions 
and the social perspective of crisis ma-
nagement. A large part of the challenge 
of good crisis management at all levels, 
from the President of the country to 
the citizens, lies in the fact that Croatia 
does not have an adequately developed 
legislative framework and crisis mana-
gement system, that existing normative 
solutions are not properly applied in 
practice, and that practice is not suffi-
ciently harmonized with the existing 
legislative framework.
In answer to the main research ques-
tion: How is Croatia managing the crisis 
in which it finds itself?, it can be said 
that Croatia is currently relatively suc-
cessful in navigating this crisis and ranks 
at the level of most Western European 
countries, with which our governments 
always like to compare themselves – nei-
ther better nor worse. This only serves 
to show that the crisis was a big surprise 
for all countries, it is still ongoing and 
its outcome is still uncertain. From an 
analytical point of view, it is interesting 
to see that two countries considered to 
be global leaders (the USA and the UK) 
failed in crisis management (both in the-
ory and in practice) during the first part 
of the crisis and therefore their popula-
tion (and not the politicians responsible 
for such a condition) is now suffering 
severe consequences. For now, Croatia 
has managed to ensure that events do 
not overwhelm us, that we do not have 
large number of infected and deceased, 
that there are no significant disturbanc-
es in the functioning of the state and 
everyday life, and that the crisis does not 
cause domino effects that would create 
additional significant damage. On the 
other hand, the crisis has shown that 
Croatia in many areas was not ready or 
able to respond to the initial impact of 
the crisis, i.e. in the financial, economic 
and tourism sectors, and therefore our 
citizens (and not responsible politi-
cians) will suffer the consequences. Op-
erationally, Prime Minister Plenković 
decided to assign crisis management to 
Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of 
the Interior Davor Božinović in charge 
of civil protection, instead of Deputy 
Prime Minister Damir Krstičević and 
Minister of Defense in charge of home-
land security. He thus determined that 
the civil protection system would be the 
platform through which Croatia would 
face the crisis, and reduced the chances 
for the homeland security system to es-
tablish itself. This was his decision and 
risk, which so far proves to be correct in 
terms of the ability of the civil protec-
tion system to coordinate and manage 
key processes. But as every crisis is also a 
good opportunity, this crisis was an ide-
al opportunity (it is now clear that it was 
a missed opportunity) to give the home-
land security system and the Coordina-
tion of the homeland security system the 
responsibility to manage the crisis. This 
way, that system could have been estab-
lished and finally become functional, 


























One of the observations coming from 
this crisis which could help politicians, 
and indirectly all others, could be that it 
is necessary to finally regulate security 
systems, their cooperation and coordi-
nation, open a public-private partner-
ship in the field of security and involve 
the scientific community in solving 
problems, so that everyone can contrib-
ute to setting the key priorities of this 
country in the field of security, and then 
work on smart specialization. As for the 
Republic of Croatia, in addition to lack-
ing a unified crisis management system, 
it also lacks a unified assessment of the 
security risks it faces. That assessment 
had to be made immediately after the 
Homeland War, because without it all 
investments and actions were brought 
down to silo mentality – where every-
one works and acts in a world of their 
own, with limited inter-sectoral coop-
eration. Once that assessment has been 
made, politicians involved in strategic 
decision-making need to be trained on 
crisis management, as at lower levels 
there is more knowledge and experi-
ence, both because of training oppor-
tunities throughout their careers and 
because of the actual operational expe-
rience. Therefore, currently there is an 
imbalance in knowledge between those 
who manage and those who are man-
aged. And finally, although the actual 
list of observations is much longer, it is 
necessary to highlight the process of les-
sons learned which consists of making 
observations like these, identifying the 
lessons and ultimately learning them. 
This country has the knowledge and the 
experts capable of drawing observations 
from all situations, including crises like 
these, and synthesizing the identified 
lessons from them, but politics must re-
fer to them and take their analyses and 
findings into consideration. Politicians 
have neither the practice nor the habit 
of doing cross-sectoral and interdiscipli-
nary post-crisis analyses with crisis-in-
volved operational forces, administra-
tive experts, the private sector and the 
academia, in order to observe what real-
ly happened during the crisis. The main 
purpose of that would be to see what 
was good and what was not that good 
with the aim of improving the reaction 
to make it better, faster and more suc-
cessful with less effort, cost and stress.
This research, its observations and re-
sults serve as an overview of the current 
state of Croatia's management of the 
current crisis. All of the above can pri-
marily serve politicians to change sys-
tems for the better, because politics has 
networked our entire society and reality, 
it has entered every pore and activity, 
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Pandemija COVID-19 i upravljanje krizom u  
Republici Hrvatskoj
Sažetak Pandemija Covid-19 i kriza koja je zahvatila sve dijelove svijeta, sve in-
dustrije i poslovne procese, znatno su promijenili uobičajen način života svih ljudi, 
uveli društvo u "novo normalno" i nametnuli potrebu upravljanja krizom. Mnoge 
organizacije i države nisu spremne dočekale krizu te imaju velike posljedice. Cilj 
je ovog rada analizirati kako je hrvatska reagirala na tu krizu s aspekta postojeće-
ga normativnog okvira upravljanja krizama i operativnih rješenja u praksi, istražiti 
ulogu vlade Republike hrvatske i njezinih čelnih ljudi u donošenju strateških od-
luka i tumačenju krize, kao i utvrditi u kojoj su mjeri korišteni sustavi domovinske 
sigurnosti i civilne zaštite u upravljanju krizom. osim toga, cilje je rada zabilježiti 
određen broj kontradiktornosti, kontroverzija i paradoksa koji su se pojavili tijekom 
krize, kao i određena zapažanja koja mogu poslužiti za buduće analize i iskustva u 
procesu učenja.
Ključne riječi pandemija Covid-19, hrvatska, krizno upravljanje, sustav domovin-
ske sigurnosti, sustav civilne zaštite

